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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Two  general  philosophical  positions  regarding  inclusive  education
have  moved  to  the  forefront  of  inclusive  education  discourse  in
Western  countries  since  the debate  about  inclusive  education  has
begun.  One  is  a  moral  doctrinal  position  advocating  full inclu-
sion  and  contending  that  integration  is  necessary  to  maintain
universal  norms  of  non-discrimination.  The  other  is an  ethical  posi-
tion  advocating  partial  inclusion.  This  latter  position  argues  that
exceptional  students  should  receive  accommodations  speciﬁc  to
their  individual  needs  through  a  combination  of  general  classroom
instruction  and  specialized  instruction  within  segregated  settings.
Taken  to their  individually  reasoned  ends,  these  two  philosophi-
cal approaches  represent  opposing  ideological  views  and  suggest  a
largely  irresolvable  debate  regarding  how  exceptional  students  are
best  served.  This  paper  presents  a  comparative  analysis  examining
the  underpinnings  of  these  dichotomies  within  Canada  and  France.
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r  é  s  u  m  é
Deux  positions  philosophiques  générales  sont  apparues  au premier
plan  du  discours  sur  l’inclusion  dans  les  pays  occidentaux  dès  le
commencement  des  débats  sur l’éducation  inclusive.  La  première
est  une  position  de  doctrine  morale  qui  revendique  l’inclusion
générale et  qui  soutient  que  celle-ci  est  nécessaire  aﬁn  de  main-
tenir  les  normes  universelles  de  non-discrimination.  L’autre  est  une
position  éthique  en  faveur  de  l’inclusion  partielle.  Cette  position
argumente  que  des  élèves  « exceptionnels  » devraient  bénéﬁcier
de dispositifs  spéciﬁques  en  fonction  de  leurs  besoins  individuels
grâce une  combinaison  d’instruction  générale  dans  la  salle  de  classe
ordinaire  et d’instruction  spécialisée  dans  un  contexte  séparé.  En
tenant  compte  de  leurs  modes  de  raisonnement  particuliers,  on
considère  que  ces  deux  approches  philosophiques  représentent  des
perspectives  idéologiques  opposées  et suggèrent  un  débat  qui  sem-
ble  largement  insoluble  sur la  question  de  savoir  comment  aider  au
mieux  les  élèves  « exceptionnels  ». Cet article  présente  une  analyse
comparative  en  examinant  les  fondements  de  ces  dichotomies  au
Canada  et  en  France.
©  2012  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous
droits  réservés.
Introduction
The schooling of children having special needs has continually sparked discussion about the space
where their educational needs would be optimally met. Between placements in special schools, spe-
cial classrooms, and mainstream classrooms, the perspectives on this dilemma have been varied, but
current tendencies advocate strongly for the inclusive classroom where children with and without
exceptionalities learn together within a same-age same-grade setting. In several Western countries
like France and Canada (through its provincial and territorial governments), which embrace principles
of inclusive education, initial practice assigned students identiﬁed as having special needs to one of
two school-based placements1. These students (hereafter referred to as exceptional students) were
either admitted to either a self-contained special education classroom or a shared-time placement
between a general education classroom and the special education classroom. Increased advocacy for
children’s educational equality, which viewed self-contained special education classrooms as anal-
ogous to segregation, initiated a move away from placements conceptualized as exclusive toward
a focus upon partial inclusion and in some instances to full inclusion within the general education
classroom. From these transformations, two general positions regarding the deﬁnition and practice of
inclusion have emerged.
On one side are proponents who contend that exceptional students have an equal right to be
educated in the general education classroom with their same-age peers. Arguing under the premise
of equality rights, in particular non-discrimination, these advocates criticize inclusive placements
that place students exclusively within a special education classroom or a shared placement between
a special education classroom and a general education classroom. In response, these advocates call
for full inclusion of exceptional students within general education classrooms. Proponents for full
inclusion argue that segregated settings, in any form, are discriminatory in that they conﬂict with
inherent rights of equality.
On the other side of the debate are those who favour partial inclusion. Proponents of this posi-
tion align themselves with the view that partial inclusion, and sometimes an exclusive placement
1 In the case of French, we have to speak about ‘institution-based’ placement, as the special education institutions are in their
majority not belonging to the Ministry of Education; for more details see the following analysis of the French setting.
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within a special education classroom, is necessary. In light of the challenges exceptional students face
within school, accommodations necessary to support their meaningful participation and advance-
ment within the educational system cannot be delivered effectively solely within a general education
system. Rather, a level of segregation might be necessary. Exceptional students, it is argued, need to
receive curriculum and instruction adapted to their individual needs and that such adaptations are
sometimes most effectively delivered through a combination of participation in a general education
classroom and through specialized programs outside of the general education classroom. Given that
different exceptionalities often require different adaptations, that students with similar exceptional-
ities experience different levels of impairment, and that an exceptional student might be identiﬁed
as having more than one exceptionality, proponents of partial inclusion recognize that for these stu-
dents the most appropriate educational context will often include adaptations implemented outside
the context of the general classroom.
When one observes the arguments advanced by both sides of this debate –proponents for full
inclusion and proponents for partial inclusion – it seems improbable for them to meet on a mutually
supportive ground. This paradox is explored and a perspective is advanced that suggests that within the
ﬁeld of special education, each position perceives inclusion in terms of equality; however, each position
argues for equality from a different conceptualization of equality. At one end are those that support
equality based upon ethical principles, at the opposite end are those that argue for equality based
upon moral doctrine. When viewed through Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1993, 1996) perspectives,
however, the philosophical underpinnings of these dichotomies are indeed complementary. Moreover,
these adversarial positions are best conceptualized along a bi-directional continuum that concurrently
endorses both moral doctrine and equity principles that undergird the notions of equal opportunity
and equal beneﬁt.
This paper is divided into three sections. In the ﬁrst section, through an analysis of selective
literature that critiques special education policy, a framework is drawn for understanding the two
dichotomies in terms of how these opposing positions view the intentions and assumed implementa-
tion of inclusive and special education policy. This section discusses two ideologies – moral doctrine
and ethical principles – embedded within arguments for and against full inclusion. These ideologies
are offered not only as appropriate methods for explaining emergent polarities, but as well, given
that these ideologies can also be placed within a continuum, they offer a suitable foundation upon
which to bridge these dichotomies; a bridge that allows each perspective to maintain allegiance to
their respective argumentative frameworks. The second section presents the Canadian and French
context of inclusion. These two countries appear to be of interest for this paper as their trajectories
of developing inclusive education have followed different paths and paces. To illustrate the Canadian
setting, the Supreme Court of Canada decision Eaton v Brant County Board of Education, 1997 (here-
after referred to as the Eaton case) will be presented. Evidence from this case allows one to synthesize
the divergent arguments for full inclusion and for partial inclusion in special education placements.
This case illustrates how an integration of the frameworks that undergird opposing views on special
education placement can be used to meet mutually accepted outcomes of special education policy. The
French setting of inclusion will be presented through an analysis of its development of schooling for
children with exceptionalities and the different bodies in charge of human rights in France. The third
section offers a conceptual and operational understanding for how one might bridge these dueling
dichotomies within each country by developing the notion of solidarity and its implications for an
inclusive practice.
Ideological dichotomies within inclusive education
Smith and Lusthaus (1995) contended that debates surrounding access to education for minority
students, whether in terms of inclusion of racial, ethnic, or special needs groups, can be viewed as
arguments respecting quality and equality. Dialogue within such debates often results in taking posi-
tions at “polar opposites on a linear continuum. To move toward one is to move away from the other;
when you accommodate one, you do so at the other’s expense” (p. 379). Within the ﬁeld of special
education, a similar discourse has arisen regarding the nature of inclusion of exceptional students
within schools. Two general views seem to present a dialectical approach and suggest a largely irre-
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solvable debate surrounding whether the needs of exceptional students are best served within a fully
inclusive system or within a partially inclusive system. By full inclusion, we understand an educa-
tional system delivering all instruction in one regular classroom setting without use of any segregated
settings for exceptional students. At one end of the continuum are those that argue for equality based
upon moral doctrine. At the other end of the continuum are those that support equality based upon
ethical principles.
Moral doctrine for full inclusion
Proponents of full inclusion insist that any policy or practice that restricts full participation in the
education system is a violation of an individual’s right to non-discrimination. When viewed through
Habermas (1993) philosophical lens, the discourse of proponents for full inclusion is analogous to a
moral argument (Crux, 1989; Forest and Pearpoint, 1992). A moral perspective positions an individual
within the context of maintaining or supporting the common interests of the citizenry (interests such
as non-discrimination), where individual perspectives and needs stem from the common interests of
the general public. Habermas (1993) situates a moral doctrine within a framework that “represents
the ideal extension of each individual communication community from within. In this forum, only
those norms that express a common interest of all affected can win justiﬁed assent” (p. 13). In brief, a
moral perspective aligns with upholding the common good by assuring that the individual is engulfed
by the protection of universal norms while simultaneously enforcing the protection of the common
good through maintaining the universality of individual rights by having the individual adhere to those
rights. Said differently, the individual is both the product and supporter of their rights.
Under the umbrella of a moral doctrine, full inclusion is predicated upon a rights-based approach;
placement of an exceptional student within a segregated setting is an act against these students’
human rights. Inequality manifests through unequal protection of the right to non-discrimination.
The results of this discrimination are twofold. Placement in a segregated setting is viewed ﬁrstly, as
restricting an exceptional student’s access to the education system equal to that of his or her peers,
and secondly as withholding the beneﬁts of social and educational experiences that are offered to
their peers.
Policy that supports segregated placements is perceived as operationalizing inequality. Two  prin-
cipal tenets emerge from this stance, one premised upon society’s view of the student and another
premised upon procedural policies adopted by special education; both have conceptual and opera-
tional elements. Proponents of full inclusion often argue that labelling students (e.g., learning disabled)
and utilizing alternative instructional methods in special classes should be eliminated (Forest and
Pearpoint, 1992). For instance, Crux (1989) argued that “labelling a child as exceptional in some way,
we have legalized inequality” and “is clearly an example of legalizing the naming of children as deviant,
in order to maintain social control” (p. 25). Labelling is seen as isolating exceptional students from their
peers. Such practices, it is argued, result in the “transformation of students with learning disabilities
into second-class citizens who are entitled to something less than other students, or who  are thought
of by others as ‘less”’ (Denti and Katz, 1995) (p. 417).
A second perspective put forth by proponents of full inclusion is that there is an absence of rigor
regarding the decision making process that places students in special needs classes. For instance, Denti
and Katz (1995) argued that “special educators, for the most part, do not have a critical perspective on
the dominant, taken for granted view of reality that undergirds this culture, and as a result, are not able
to criticize their culture effectively or change it in fundamental ways” (p. 418). These researchers sug-
gested that special educators do not take a critical perspective on issues that challenge their ﬁeld and
contend that educators must extract themselves from individual contexts and embrace a generalized
perspective of the collective good. A moral doctrine takes its precedence in its intention to subsume
the individual and protect him or her through a conceptual barrier where the individual is sheltered
from infringements upon their right to equality of access and to equality of the educational beneﬁts
full inclusion provides. By privileging decisions for full participation, advocates for full inclusion pro-
pose an understanding of an exceptional student’s intended experience that parallels the interests of
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the common good, an understanding that positions the exceptional student solely within the assumed
(and shared) experience of the citizenry.
Ethical principles of partial inclusion
Rawls (1971) contended that in a democratic society equality should be conceptualized as equal
citizenship and equal opportunity. His notion of equal citizenship suggests that each citizen can be
characterized as having individual abilities, abilities that will not always parallel in type or in level
to others. Within this context, while each individual has different abilities, each holds a position on
the same plane of social worth. Equality of opportunity concerns the liberty within the larger society
for each individual to explore and exercise their individual abilities. Supporters of partial inclusion
contend that periodic placement of exceptional students in segregated settings is necessary for these
students’ educational and social-emotional development. For these students to have opportunities
to experience social and educational beneﬁts naturally afforded to their peers, exceptional students
must receive individualized instruction that is developmentally appropriate (Fuchs and Fuchs, 1994).
This position, when viewed through Rawls (1971) philosophical lens, suggests adherence to an eth-
ical approach (an individualized context) when making decisions to place students within special
education settings.
Arguments for privileging an ethical position of partial inclusion over a moral position of full inclu-
sion are found where policy is enacted through procedure. Bachor and Crealock (1986) provided a
useful lens through which ethical principles can be operationalized within processes that undergird
procedures for identifying and accommodating the needs of exceptional students. These researchers
viewed the transformation of special education policy into practice as a complex of psychoeduca-
tional procedures “which view both educational assessment of exceptional students and educational
programming as a systematic problem-solving or decision making process” (p. 2). Contextual ele-
ments that inform these procedures are based upon interpersonal factors (e.g., social relationships) and
intrapersonal factors (e.g., cognitive abilities). These elements often come together through individual
or general classroom instruction.
Guidance for understanding special education and inclusion in terms of ethical principles can be
found in Dewey’s notions of ethics and education within democratic societies. A literal interpretation
of Dewey suggests that full inclusion for exceptional students best represents the argument presented
by moral doctrine where freedom to wonder intellectually and to engage freely with one’s learning
environment witnesses education’s full potential. However, the contextual understanding of individ-
ual differences that characterize exceptional students and the special education policy and practice
referenced to these students, is also embedded within Deweyan concepts. Dewey (1957) embraced
the notion of “function” and “adjustment” to support his ethic of self-realization within a democratic
society. These terms are informative in that each represents extensions of the ethical principles that
support partial inclusion. Function describes how individuals perform and position themselves that
enables them to maximize the development of their individual abilities (Westbrook, 1991). Adjust-
ment provides the connection between the individual’s abilities and the contexts where they exercise
their abilities. Importantly, these adjustments are mutually supportive; contexts as well as individuals
adjust to facilitate ability development.
Vital to such pedagogical foundations are contextual elements that inform ongoing assessment of
a student’s individual progress and teacher instruction. Educational accommodations for exceptional
students are viewed “not in terms of the presence or absence of a handicap or advantage but in terms
of his or her speciﬁc educational needs” (Bachor and Crealock, 1986) (p. 2). Without due attention to
individual needs and of individual lived experience, one runs the risk of not recognizing the “very
real difﬁculties experienced by some children. Similarly, the fact that categories of special needs are
socially created and that the application of them to particular children is imperfect does not mean
that the difﬁculties to which they refer are not real” (Croll and Moses, 1985, p. 20).
Habermas (1993, 1996) argued that ethics focus upon individualistic notions of self-identity, self-
understanding, and individual perceptions of how one positions oneself within larger society. Citizens
extend themselves into the larger world when envisioning themselves as “members who, in the face
of important life issues, want to gain clarity about their shared form of life and about the ideals
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they feel should shape their common life” (Coulter, 2002) (p. 93). Moreover, Habermas (1993) argued
not for exclusivity of individual perspective, rather, for complementary perspectives informed by
the introspective self and through dialogue with others. Referring to social issues, Coulter (2002)
contended that contradiction between individual needs and societal norms arises when particular
social issues are abstracted from context in order to facilitate universal discourse. He argued further,
universal understandings apply to speciﬁc situations, they must not stem from speciﬁc situations.
Moreover, discourse of social issues that adheres to context must follow a second tenet, “one in which
the guiding principle is not universalization, but appropriateness” (p. 94). Within an ethical framework,
therefore, universalization reﬂective of a moral doctrine approach and its loyalty to common interests
is abandoned in favour of appropriateness that addresses negotiations between the individual and the
contexts of individual experience.
In sum, both dichotomies of the inclusion debate frame their arguments in terms of equality. An eth-
ical perspective extends from particular contexts that exceptional individual’s experience, whereas
morality ascribes experience and expands to form general notions of what characterizes and sup-
ports universal norms. Proponents of partial inclusion argue that full inclusion does not effectively
advance the educational development of all exceptional students, rather partial segregation is neces-
sary to meet the individual needs – educational and social-emotional – of some exceptional students.
Proponents of full inclusion contend that segregated placements sustain systemic and institutional
inequality. Under this rationale, exceptional students must be presented with full access to the educa-
tional system in order to be afforded full participation within and beneﬁt from the education system.
Within Canada, the Eaton case and its ﬁnal resolution in front of the Supreme Court of Canada illus-
trates the tension between proponents and opponents of partial inclusion and provides a backdrop
on which to view moral and ethical perspectives respecting decisions of inclusion. In France, the new
legislation about the schooling of children with disabilities (Loi de 2005 – Act of 2005) and the debate
following this law inside the different human rights bodies will illustrate the tension between both
positions.
The Canadian setting
Within Canada, there is a historical record of excluding students with disabilities from the general
education system (Lupart, 1998). Since the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 and its
embedded Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter referred to as the Charter) the right to non-
discrimination was ingrained in the fabric of Canadian society. With the promulgation of the right to
non-discrimination, advocates for students with exceptionalities have lobbied their respective schools
and school boards to give these young people access to the general education system. In response,
Provincial and Territorial governments have developed and adopted inclusionary policies in attempts
to ensure that exceptional students are provided access to the public education system in a manner
equal to that of their non-exceptional peers.
Arguing from a rights-based perspective based upon non-discrimination necessarily requires that
schools judge the merits of inclusion on decisions regarding adherence to fundamental rights and
freedoms contained within the Charter. Practice and policy that place exceptional students outside
the general classroom, even if for only a minimal part of the day, are viewed as analogous to an
intrusion on the student’s rights as stated in the Charter:
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal beneﬁt of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Within Canadian public education settings, incidents of suspected inequality also fall under the
scope of the respective government, within their Provincial or Territorial Education Acts and educa-
tional documents (e.g., in Ontario the Antiracism and Ethnocultural Equity in School Boards: Guidelines
for Policy Development and Implementation, 1993). Governmental education documents observe uni-
versally accepted tenets contained within human rights legislation and the Charter. This is a powerful
framework because it appeals to shared beliefs and responsibilities viewed as fundamental to the
equal protection and equal beneﬁt of individual rights. The Eaton v Brant County Board of Education,
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1997 is an equally powerful example of arguments used to support the educational needs of students
with exceptionalities.
Eaton v Brant County Board of Education, 1997
Emily Eaton was a 12-year-old girl with cerebral palsy who  was  unable to communicate through
speech, sign language, or through other assistive communication devices. She had some visual impair-
ment and because of limited mobility needed the assistance of a wheelchair. Emily was identiﬁed as
an exceptional student by an Ontario Identiﬁcation, Placement and Review Committee (IPRC). These
governmentally mandated and school board managed committees provide for the identiﬁcation of
exceptional students, a determination of their needs, and the boundaries for their placement in an
educational setting where special education programs and services are to be delivered. The speciﬁc
program accommodations and services required by each exceptional student are outlined in an Indi-
vidual Education Plan (IEP). Parents and the student (if they are 16 years of age or older) are involved
in each phase of process.
At her parents’ request, Emily was initially placed within a general classroom, a fully inclusive
setting at her neighbourhood school. A full-time educational assistant, whose principal function was
to attend to Emily’s needs, was assigned to the classroom. In a review conducted at the end of the
third year of her placement, Emily’s teachers and educational assistants concluded that the place-
ment was not in Emily’s best interests, and in some instances, this placement appeared detrimental
to her educational progress. In assessing the appropriate placement for Emily, the IPRC (and subse-
quent appeal processes) considered several areas relevant to her needs and to the school’s educational
responsibilities:
• intellectual and academic;
• communication;
• emotional and social;
• and physical and personal safety.
In its evaluation, the IPRC found considerable evidence that Emily experienced a profound learning
deﬁcit. While signiﬁcant modiﬁcations were made to the curriculum for Emily and that instruction
was conducted parallel to her peers within the regular classroom, the committee concluded that these
practices were not effectively meeting Emily’s needs. Emily’s ability to communicate meaningfully
with her peers and teachers was severely limited due to her various physical and cognitive challenges.
Both Emily’s mother and Emily’s educational assistants observed that for Emily to learn sign language
she needed sustained, repetitive hand-over-hand instruction. The IPRC agree, contending that the
need to communicate effectively and meaningfully was vital to Emily’s classroom participation and
educational progress, and concluded that instruction within a special education setting would provide
maximum opportunity for her learning. In evaluating Emily’s emotional and social experiences, the
IPRC reported that Emily’s teachers and educational assistants found that her classmates tended not
to involve themselves with her in class or at play. The IPRC noted that while her social interaction
in classroom and school settings was limited, she nevertheless might be receiving some unobserved
beneﬁt. However, Emily’s classroom behaviours (i.e., crying, sleeping, and persistent verbal outbursts)
seemed to be increasing over the years and to be restricting opportunities for her to interact with
others. As well, her outbursts interfered with her classmates’ learning and presented challenges to her
own learning. According to the IPRC, accommodations based upon physical access were reasonable
and should be made to the classroom and school, regardless of whether a special classroom might
be better designed to address her needs. Regarding her personal safety, the IPRC expressed concern
with Emily’s tendency to place objects in her mouth. The IPRC contended that it was  not reasonably
possible to structure a classroom where there were no small objects or to establish the level of adult
supervision necessary for Emily to be present in a fully inclusive regular classroom.
Based upon these assessments, the IPRC concluded that Emily needed an environment that
maximized the possibility for educational outcomes, through highly specialized instructional (e.g.,
one-on-one instruction), technological resources (e.g., communicative devices), and a structured
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environment (i.e., small class size to minimize distractions). Balanced by Emily’s various individ-
ual special needs and taking into account the level of intervention she required, the IPRC concluded
that the best possible setting was a partial inclusive placement based from a special education
classroom. This placement was designed to accommodate Emily’s social-emotional and academic
development. In the morning, Emily would follow the class cycle and participate in classroom activ-
ities. In the afternoon, within a special needs classroom, Emily would receive specialized instruction
designed to meet her various needs. Emily’s parents appealed the decision to the Ontario Spe-
cial Education Appeal Board. They based their appeal upon section 15 of the Charter, and asserted
Emily’s right to non-discrimination based upon her physical and learning disabilities. The Special
Education Appeal Board unanimously upheld the IPRC decision. After unsuccessfully appealing to
several provincial educational appeal committees, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal
conﬁrming Emily’s parent’s requests. Subsequently, the school board appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court of Canada. The Court afﬁrmed the earlier decisions, ﬁnding that Emily’s right to
non-discrimination was not violated and supported the IPRC decision for a partial inclusive place-
ment.
The French setting
While Canada refers to the Charter of Rights and Freedom and has a longer tradition about the
schooling of children with exceptionalities, France has made schooling for children with exceptional-
ities mandatory with the recent Act of 2005 (Pour l’égalité des droits et des chances, la participation et la
citoyenneté des personnes handicapées – for equal rights and opportunities, participation and citizenship
of handicapped persons) which has replaced the Act of 1975 (en faveur des personnes handicapées – in
favour of handicapped persons).
The Act of 1975 (Loi d’orientation en faveur des personnes handicapées – in favour of handicapped
persons) promoted integration of children with disabilities into the mainstream school system, but
the obligation to schooling was not part of this legislation, only the notion of “educational obliga-
tion” (obligation educative) appeared in the text which could be fulﬁlled in a school or an institutional
setting. In 2003, most of the children with disabilities were either in medico-social institutions or in
so-called collective integration classrooms (classe d’intégration scolaire – CLIS), mainly in elementary
schools (DREES, 2003). One may  talk in that sense of a “mixed” system of education of children with
disabilities (see chart in Plaisance, 2009) (p. 117). These ‘medico-social’ settings are also often run
by associations and only funded or subsidized by public bodies, but free of charge for the concerned
families. “One can ﬁnd the opposition between republican and laicistic culture, grounded in a long
tradition of equality (at least formally), and a private associative culture, grounded in local if not per-
sonal, initiatives, according to the principle of subsidiarity.” (Chauvière and Plaisance, 2008) (p. 39)2.
Education of children with exceptionalities has always been a challenge for the French system, as the
emphasis on equality (égalité) is very strong. The republican model of education tries to treat everyone
equally in a meritocratic, centralized and rather homogenized state. This tradition makes the recog-
nition of diversity and differences a bigger challenge than it might be in Canada where the idea of
multiculturalism is part of the self-perception of the country.
Political pressure by associative groups, parents and the international context led to a new legisla-
tion in 2005 that tried to implement change to the system that was  considered to be unsatisfactory for
the education and schooling of children with disabilities, neither for the overall situation of persons
with disabilities in France. An overall lack of adequate solutions and spaces for their care and educa-
tion, as well as limited opportunities for participation in society were deplored. The new Act of 2005
makes a shift from the dual culture towards more schooling (scolarisation) of children with disabilities.
The Act requires the enrolment of all children into their neighbourhood school regardless of the dis-
ability or difﬁculty this child may  have. Even though this new legislation is a very revolutionary act in
2 In French : « À la culture républicaine et laïque du côté de l’école, ancrée dans une longue tradition de l’égalité (au moins
formelle), s’oppose une culture associative privée, ancrée dans les initiatives localisées, voire personnalisées, selon le principe
de  subsidiarité ».
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the dual culture around disability, it does not automatically mean that the child with disabilities will
actually attend this school. The decision about the best place for schooling of this child will be made by
a pluridisciplinary committee called the commission for rights and autonomy (Commission des Droits
et de l’Autonomie) in dialogue with the families. The implementation of the personalized schooling
project (Projet Personalisé de Scolarisation) is then followed by a ‘referent teacher’ (enseignant référent).
Thus, a child’s schooling can still occur in one of the medico-social institutions, but should now have
mandatory access to a teacher (which was not necessarily the case with the former legislation). Obvi-
ously, the placement decision is based on ethical assumptions rather than a moral requirement of full
inclusion.
Thus, the French legislation is shifting to an enforceable right to education, which can be claimed
in courts (droit opposable –opposability) if not fulﬁlled. This signiﬁes a change in the way French legis-
lation handles inequalities by individualizing the access to schooling (Chauvière and Plaisance, 2008)
(p. 35). Any individual has the right to go to a regular school and if this right is not fulﬁlled, s/he can
go to court to ask for it. Further legislation is watching over the implementation of this policy. The
HALDE (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité – High Authority of struggle
against discriminations and for equality) has been created in 2004 by the Act against Discrimina-
tions (Law of Dec 30 2004). This administrative independent authority has the legal right to engage
penal law in proved cases of discrimination. Several times over the last years, this authority has got-
ten involved into the question of schooling of children with disabilities, in particular by publishing a
report about the schooling of children with disabilities in the elementary school3 in order to better
perceive the national situation. One can also ﬁnd several deliberations about the schooling of autistic
children4 in a regular classroom which have resulted in the authority reminding the school admin-
istrators to implement the law of 2005 and that refusing those children is not an option for these
schools. Another deliberation5 recommends the French government to ratify the UN-Convention for
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and also its additional protocol6. As this committee has legal
power to ﬁght discriminations, its inﬂuence can be considered important. If the Authority recognizes
that discrimination has occurred, it has the power to implement change so that the law is respected.
Given the recent decisions concerning the schooling of children with disabilities, it can be consid-
ered as the moral ‘watchdog’ of equality and human rights, thus representing the moral side of our
argument.
On the other hand, the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (National Consulta-
tive Human Rights Commission) has recently emitted an opinion about the schooling of children with
disabilities7. In summarizing the recent new experience with the law of 2005, the report recognizes
progress that has been done since 2005, but criticizes the still weak proportion of children schooled
in secondary schools in France. The Commission observes a number of inequalities in the advance-
ment of schooling of children with disabilities. But it also warns about the notion of opposability in
regards to the education of children with disabilities. “The CNCDH would like to remind [. . .]  that the
right to schooling is not of absolute character and that one has to avoid to put fragile children into
a situation of failure in a non-matching environment.” (p. 2)8. Similarly to the Eaton case in Canada,
this body represents the ethical viewpoint on current inclusive practices. In France, these two bodies
show the opposition between the moral and ethical principle of inclusive education. While one com-
mittee insists on the legislative texts for the right to schooling, the other warns about the negative
consequences that an unprepared setting could have for the individual child. Morally, the legislative
text demands the schooling of children with exceptionalities, but ethically, the reality needs to be
acknowledged, in the best interest of the child.
3 Halde (2009), Sondage sur la scolarisation en milieu ordinaire des enfants en situation de handicap dans les établissements
du  premier degré, Rapport d’étude no 0801046, janvier 2009.
4 Délibération no 2007-90 du 26 mars 2007, Délibération no 2008-169 du 7 juillet 2008.
5 Délibération no 2009-114 du 2 mars 2009.
6 France has signed and ratiﬁed the convention and the protocol in 2010.
7 CNCDH (2008), Avis sur la scolarisation des enfants handicapés, adopté en Assemblée plénière le 6 novembre 2008.
8 « [. . .]  la CNDH souhaite rappeler [. . .]  que le droit à la scolarisation ne revêt pas de caractère absolu et qu’il faut se garder
de  placer en situation d’échec des enfants fragiles auxquels le milieu ordinaire ne correspondrait pas ».
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Bridging moral and ethical discourse: the notion of solidarity
Exposing the dilemma of inclusive education between those two dichotomies, what could possible
solutions be to fulﬁll moral as well as ethical principles of inclusive education? We  need to be cognizant
that ideological positions in education tend to overlook particular needs. It seems appropriate to
introduce the notion of solidarity in an attempt to bridge the two discourses discussed above. The
moral argument asks for equal justice for all members of society. From Habermas’ perspective, “Justice
concerns the equal freedoms of unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity concerns
the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life–and
thus also to the maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself. Moral norms cannot protect
one without the other: they cannot protect the equal rights and freedoms of the individual without
protecting the welfare of one’s fellow man  and of the community to which the individuals belong.”
(Habermas, 1990) (p. 244) Solidarity concerns the social cohesion, the mutual responsibility that links
two or more persons (Zoll, 2001). Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity
provides an instructive perspective that reaches into the dilemmas of inclusive education. Durkheim
(1960) argued that mechanical solidarity is based on a society that does not recognize differences and
diversity and is founded on resemblance, whereas organic solidarity arises out of the recognition of
diversity and does not need the idea of sameness in order to attribute equal rights.
Concretely, what does this mean for inclusive education? It insists on the moral argument turned
into a legislative text (the Charter in Canada or the Loi de 2005 in France), but also recognizes the
ethical concern of people having different needs. As Zoll puts it “The stranger is the real challenge
of social cohesion” (Zoll, 2001) (p. 111). The child with exceptionalities constitutes an incertitude
as his/her particular needs question the systems put in place. The question must then be how social
cohesion can be upheld by using Rawls’ idea of fairness: what is ‘fair’ to the particular child in question,
what educational offer can be made for this particular child when taking into account the child’s
current needs, what are the available educational contexts (special institution–special classroom –
mainstream classroom – a blend of two or more of these?).
Two different challenges stem from the encounter of the child with exceptionalities and the child’s
encounter with the social (educational) system: accommodating the particular child’s needs while
critically examining the offers in place. “Solidarity with what is uniquely particular to the individual
case is demanded of the judge, who must ﬁrst ﬁnd the criteria by which like things can be treated in
like manner, and it is demanded of him to a higher degree than it is of the legislator, who may  not
ignore the «no»  of suppressed needs.” (Habermas, 1990) (p. 249). We  have shown above, especially in
the Eaton case how it has been necessary to argue with the ethical principles of inclusive education
in order to meet Emily’s needs as effectively as possible. On the other hand, the notion of solidarity
not only needs to look at the current well-being of a child, but also takes into account the legisla-
tive moral context, assessing to what extent human and ﬁnancial resources as well as expertise are
available. This is important for both contexts. The lack of resources and expertise in schools should
not automatically lead into the ethical argument that special settings are meeting better the needs of
children with exceptionalities. Solidarity extends from the ethical argument about the best possible
educational setting for a particular child to the moral argument on how to staff and equip schools in
order to provide effective inclusive opportunities for a seemingly expanding population of students
with exceptionalities. The second argument is especially important for French schools where the pos-
tulation of full inclusion of children with exceptionalities constitutes a very new and challenging task
to negotiate. The notion of solidarity can help to make the appropriate decisions in particular situa-
tions without losing the perspective of improving and reforming the educational system in order to
achieve more inclusiveness. In this sense, inclusive education could also be reconsidered under the
idea of accessibility and universal design (Bickenbach et al., 1999; Zola, 1989): how to create forms of
schooling that are able accessible for a diverse group of learners? Brown (2006) (p. 9) deﬁnes acces-
sibility as a “liberty to enter, to approach, to communicate with, to pass to and from, or to make use
of a situation”. In this sense, solidarity leads to the continual development of increasingly accessible
educational systems for all its citizens.
“Discursive situations within a single society, in which conﬂicts over norms are adjudicated, estab-
lish the possibility of such solidarity, because one can put oneself in the place of the other, grasp what
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his or her needs and interests are, and discover, constitute, or reafﬁrm commonalities and collective
identity. Such processes should enrich the self-understanding of all the actors involved. On the other
side, solidarity makes discourse meaningful and reafﬁrms the logic of reciprocal recognition at its
heart. In other words, we can have solidarity with others with whom we  share a collective identity
without sharing or even necessarily liking their personal needs and values [. . .].  But we  do have to
accept these differences, to the extent that they are constituted in discourse as private.” (Cohen and
Arato, 1992) (p. 383–4).
A discourse of solidarity around inclusive education needs to return to the discussion of diversity
and difference, and open up the ‘black box’ of inclusive education: how do children themselves experi-
ence their inclusion in the mainstream classroom or in the special classroom? This discussion has been
silenced too long under the guise of the moral imperative of inclusive education. As Chauvière and
Plaisance (2008) (p. 44) articulated, the generalization of the inclusion of people with exceptionalities
marks the return of the ethical, the qualitative question: “Generally, we know that universality without
the subject excludes certain subjects. Hence, an approach that might be too abstract could tomorrow
lead to excluding certain subjects who are deemed to be more ‘difﬁcult’ than others. Thus, for success-
ful inclusion, in a context of individualisation as it is ours, the question of the subject becomes more
central than ever.”9
References
Bachor, D. G., & Crealock, C. (1986). Instructional strategies for students with special needs. Toronto: Prentice.
Bickenbach, J. E., Chatterji, S., Badley, E. M.,  & Üstün, T. B. (1999). Models of disablement, universalism and the international
classiﬁcation of impairments, disabilities and handicaps. Social Science and Medicine, 48,  1173–1187.
Brown, S. C. (2006). Accessibility. In G. L. Albrecht, & Gale Group (Eds.), Encyclopedia of disability (pp. 9–13). Thousand Oaks,
Calif:  Sage Publications.
Chauvière, M.,  & Plaisance. (2008/1). Les conditions d’une culture partagée. Reliance, 27,  31–44.
Cohen, J., & Arato, A. (1992). Civil society and political theory.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT  Press.
Coulter, D. (2002). Teaching as communicative action: Habermas and education. In V. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of research on
teaching.  Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.
Croll, P., & Moses, D. (1985). One in Five. The Assessment and Incidence of Special Educational Needs. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Denti, L. G., & Katz, M.  S. (1995). Escaping the cave to dream new dreams: a normative vision for learning disabilities. Journal of
Learning Disabilities, 28,  415–424.
Durkheim, E. (1960). De la division au travail social. Paris: PUF. (ﬁrst published in 1893).
Crux, S. C. (1989). Special education legislation: Humanitarian or legalized deviance and control? Education Canada, 29,  24–31.
Dewey, J. (1957). Outlines of a critical theory of ethics. New York: Hillary House. (Original work published 1891).
Eaton  v Brant County Board of Education (1997), 1 S.C.R. 241.
DREES (2003). La scolarisation des enfants et adolescents handicapés. Études et résultats, 216.
Forest, M.,  & Pearpoint, J. C. (1992). “Putting all kids on the MAP”. Educational Leadership,  50,  26–31.
Fuchs, D., & Fuchs, L. S. (1994). Inclusive schools movement and the radicalization of special education reform. Exceptional
Children,  60,  294–309.
Habermas, J. (1990). Justice and solidarity: on the discussion concerning stage 6. In T. Wren (Ed.), The Moral Domain. Essays in
the  Ongoing Discussion between Philosophy and the Social Sciences (4th ed, pp. 224–251). Cambridge, MA:  MIT  Press.
Habermas, J. (1993). Justiﬁcation and application: Remarks on discourse ethics.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT  Press. (C. P. Cronin, Trans).
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge, MA:  MIT
Press.  (W.  Rehg, Trans).
Lupart, J. L. (1998). Setting right the delusion of inclusion: implications for Canadian schools. Canadian Journal of Education,  23,
251–264.
Plaisance, E. (2009). Autrement capables. École, emploi, société; pour l’inclusion des personnes handicapées. Paris: Autrement.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge MA:  Harvard University Press.
Smith, W.  J., & Lusthaus, C. (1995). The nexus of equality and quality in education: a framework for debate. Canadian Journal of
Education,  20,  378–391.
Westbrook, R. B. (1991). John Dewey and American democracy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Zola, I. K. (1989). Toward the necessary universalizing of a disability policy. The Milbank Quarterly, 67(Supplement 2), 401–428
(Part  2). Disability policy: restoring socioeconomic independence.
Zoll, R. (2001). Le déﬁ de la solidarité organique. Avons-nous besoin de nouvelles institutions pour préserver la cohésion sociale?
Revue  du Mauss,  18,  105–118.
9 In French. « On sait, de manière générale, que l’universalité sans le sujet exclut certains sujets. Or, une approche trop abstraite
de  l’universalité de l’inclusion pourrait demain aboutir à exclure certains sujets, jugés plus « difﬁciles » que d’autres. Pour réussir
l’inclusion, dans un contexte d’individualisation tel que le nôtre, la question du sujet devient donc plus que jamais centrale ».
